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I.  PURPOSE OF THE WORK AND THEORETICAL PREMISES 
 The aim of this Essay is to examine how courts and public institutions 
have dealt with conflicts caused by the varied practices of distinct cultural 
groups.  The conflicts that will be examined are extracted from the Spanish 
reality, although the work will also allude to other European contexts.  If we 
do not want to limit ourselves to a mere narration of cases, but instead want 
to judge the reaction of public institutions to those conflicts, we must set 
some premises from which we will be able to form an opinion and 
judgment about them. 
 First, from a juridical point of view, there are several sources of 
conflict arising in the multicultural context.  Individuals must fulfill certain 
conditions, which are set in our laws from a cultural perspective, to exercise 
some rights.  There are also legal rights and institutions conceived from 
particular cultural perspectives.  Additionally, there are prohibitions and 
obstacles to behaviors that differ from those characteristic of the national 
group, which holds the position of political, social, and economic leadership 
in the state.  We can consider these conditions, contents, institutions, 
obstacles, and prohibitions to be culturally conditioned. 
 When a state and a legal system attempt to create a space for the 
coexistence of all people within the state’s territory, the cultural perspective 
should not play any role in the juridical decisions concerning what is 
allowed and what is forbidden or on what conditions the state should 
remain neutral in the cultural domain.  Thus the state must not show any 
preference for any cultural solution when making such determinations.1  
This prohibition is necessary; otherwise, by accepting certain cultural 
preferences, the state is at the same time excluding those of other cultures.  
Such a process would inevitably cause the state to contradict its inclusive 
purpose.2  These culturally conditioned contents, institutions, obstacles, and 
                                                                                                             
 ? Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Seville.  
 1. See generally NATHAN GLAZER, WE ARE ALL MULTICULTURALISTS NOW 20 (1997) 
(exploring “the conflict over multiculturalism,” the “social situation from which it has emerged,” and 
considering its “implications for the future of American society”); William A. Galston, Two Concepts of 
Liberalism, 105 ETHICS 516, 524–28 (1995) (favoring neutrality in liberal states as a means for 
individual and group differences to persist and be recognized—“we cannot give diversity its due without 
attending to its institutional preconditions . . . no pluribus without the unum”).  
 2. The aim is to treat cultural diversity like political and ideological diversity are treated when 
we speak about the inclusive purpose of the state and the constitution.  Klaus Stern’s classical ideas 
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prohibitions, when incorporated into law, reflect the state’s favoritism of 
the cultural preferences of the leading social groups over the cultural 
preferences of the other smaller social groups.  Put more simply, neutrality 
should be conceived of as active neutrality.  In this sense, neutrality is not 
indifference, but rather doing everything that is possible “to help or to 
hinder” everyone to the same degree.3 
 Second, the subject of our legal rights is that of the individual—the 
single person—not the cultural group.  While a culture is a collective 
phenomenon in which experiences, customs, behaviors, language, and life 
philosophies that are common to a social group can be formed, the right to 
follow these customs belongs to the individuals who compose these groups.  
If we consider dignity and autonomy of the individual to be basic principles 
of our law, from which constitutionally recognized rights derive, then we 
must admit that individuals have the right to follow the behaviors of the 
group defining their cultural framework or to follow other behaviors.  We 
must also accept, as a consequence, that the group has no right to force its 
members to follow the behaviors that are supposed to be characteristic of 
it.4 
 In any case, there are certainly claims common to the majority of the 
members of a group that are expressed collectively through the conferred 
right of a group’s representatives.5  We can define cultural claims as those 
                                                                                                             
about the inclusive purpose of the state can be applied to treat multicultural diversity.  For more on the 
inclusive purpose of the state, see Ruth Rubio Marín, La inclusión del inmigrante: un reto para las 
democracias constitucionales, in EXTRANJERÍA E INMIGRACIÓN: ACTAS DE LAS IX JORNADAS DE LA 
ASOCIACIÓN DE LETRADOS DEL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL 11 (Centro de estudios políticos y 
constitucionales, Cuardenos y debates No. 160, 2004) (Spain) [hereinafter EXTRANJERÍA E 
INMIGRACIÓN]; and Javier de Lucas, La(s) Sociedad(es) Multicultural(es) y los Conflictos Políticos y 
Jurídicos, in LA MULTICULTURALIDAD 59, 83–84 (Consejo General del Poder Judicial, Cuadernos de 
Derecho Judicial No. 6, 2001) (Spain). 
 3. JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 113 (1986) (quoting Alan Montefiore, 
Neutrality, Indifference and Detachment, in NEUTRALITY AND IMPARTIALITY: THE UNIVERSITY AND 
POLITICAL COMMITMENT 4, 5 (Alan Montefiore ed., 1975)). 
 4. Certainly, the concept of human dignity has often been used to criticize the idea of the 
existence of cultural rights from a perspective that equates admitting the existence of such rights with 
imposing a collective restriction upon an individual’s behavior, contrary to his or her autonomy.  An 
interesting journal article, Eva Martínez Sempere, Derechos humanos y diversidad individual, 4 
ARAUCARIA vol. 4, no. 8, 2002, available at http://digbig.com/4pfer, follows this line of reasoning.  
These theories value an individual’s right to autonomy.  To overcome the divide between human dignity 
and culture, we must consider the right to one’s own culture as an element of human dignity.  
 5. See Matteo Gianni, ¿Cuál Podría Ser la Concepción Liberal de Ciudadanía Diferenciada? 
[Which Could Be the Liberal Conception of Differentiated Citizenship?], in LA MULTICULTURALIDAD, 
supra note 2, at 13 (regarding problems with representation of small groups); Iris Marion Young, 
Deferring Group Representation, in ETHNICITY AND GROUP RIGHTS 349, 351 (Ian Shapiro & Will 
Kymlicka eds., 1997) (discussing problems with group representation of various interests, experiences, 
and needs). 
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that are expressed to: (1) change the laws in order to modify or abolish the 
conditions set for the exercise of a right; (2) change the content of a right or 
the definition of an institution; (3) abolish obstacles to and prohibitions on 
the exercise of a right; or (4) include in the definition of the rights and 
institutions concepts that reflect the cultural group’s understanding of them. 
 But recognizing a group’s right to force its members to follow the 
behaviors considered by its representatives to be characteristic of that group 
creates an abusive imbalance of power within the group that limits the 
dignity and autonomy of its members.6  Synthesizing the collective nature 
of cultural phenomena with the individual right to live one’s own culture 
can resolve the classical opposition between universalism and 
multiculturalism.7 
 Obviously, it is impossible to ignore the existence of collective rights.  
For instance, in the domain of federalism, official recognition of the 
language within a cultural community can be demonstrated by the 
requirement that all school teaching must be conducted in a certain 
language.  In this example, the measure is based on the right of the 
community to keep its cultural characteristics by requiring that all its 
members be educated in the official language, ignoring parents’ possible 
desire that their children receive an education in another language.  Such is 
the case in Catalonia, where the autonomous political institutions have 
decided that Catalan is the language that must be used as a “vehicle” for 
teaching at school.8  But rights based on cultural facts should not be 
extended to the point at which they force the members of a cultural group to 
                                                                                                             
 6. JUAN JOSÉ SEBRELI, EL ASEDIO A LA MODERNIDAD: CRÍTICA DEL RELATIVISIMO 
CULTURAL (5th ed. 1992). 
 7. For a complete examination of the questions raised by the concept of collective rights, see 
generally Neus Torbisco Casals, La Intercultualidad Possible: El Reconcimiento de Derechos 
Colectivos, in LA MULTICULTURALIDAD, supra note 2, at 271.  According to this author, who follows 
Raz’s theories on this point, collective rights can be understood as rights to public goods, that is to say, 
to goods that are important for the welfare of a group of people, in such a way that reference to that 
group becomes necessary.  Id. at 304; see also RAZ, supra note 3, at 138 (discussing different 
conceptions of “welfarism”) (citing Amartya Sen, Utilitarianism and Welfarism, 76 J. PHIL. 463, 471–
79 (1979)).  According to Rainer Baubök, the justification of collective rights comes from individual 
interests and the decisive value of individual’s welfare stemming from those individual interests, not 
from a decisive value of the collective by itself.  Rainer Baubök, Justificaciones liberales para los 
derechos de los grupos étnicos, in CIUDADANÍA: JUSTICIA SOCIAL, IDENTIDAD Y PARTICIPACIÓN 159, 
171 (1999) (Spain). 
 8. Arts. 20–21 of the LLei 1/1998, de 7 de gener, de política lingüística, Parlament de 
Catalunya [Law of Jan. 7, 1998 of political linguistics, Catalonian Parliament] (Diari oficial de la 
Generalitat de Catalunya [D.O.G.C.] 1998, p. 291) (Boletín Oficial del Estado [B.O.E.] 1998, 2989), 
available at http://digbig.com/4pffk.  See generally Pau Puig i Scotoni, Exercising Self-Determination 
Without Jeopardising the Rights of the Others: The Catalan Model, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 395 (2001) 
(discussing the “Catalan model” of self-determination). 
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act in the way considered characteristic of that group in their private lives.  
Rights based on cultural elements must be recognized in order to increase 
the possibilities from which people can choose a way of life and not to 
reduce to only one possibility individuals’ options to autonomously choose 
their own behavior, no matter how much that possibility is supported by 
cultural arguments.  Attempts to force people to follow one line of behavior 
should not be considered as a cultural sign, but as a sign of the existence of 
power relationships among the members of one social group. 
 Third, the idea that rights of cultural identity derive from universal 
rights—as asserted in most classical theories of liberalism—is a fiction.  
We know that all individuals have a cultural environment that forms the 
basis of their behavior, feelings, and beliefs.  The cultural constructions of 
the elitists of the groups that have directed the political, social, cultural, and 
economic life in every state have been the origin for the creation of a 
national culture.9  This national culture has been considered to be the 
natural culture.  The cultural elements of juridical norms have remained 
hidden because they were assumed to be natural.  These cultural elements 
were accepted only because they were treated as natural elements of 
citizens’ rights. 
 In this way, the cultural component of citizenship has remained 
traditionally invisible.  But this exclusion has resulted in the idea of a 
supposed universal citizen, which affected only those individuals who were 
not members of society’s leading cultural group.  Those who were members 
of the culturally leading group were able to practice their cultural 
preferences because those preferences were considered to be natural 
attributes of the universal citizen.  The right to equality consecrated in a 
state’s constitution was reserved for those who fulfilled the legal conditions 
for citizenship.10  Those who practiced different lifestyles had to accept, in 
                                                                                                             
 9. For discussion of the cultural costs of creating a nationality, see generally WILL 
KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS 10–25 (1995) 
(outlining the patterns of cultural diversity and noting the criticism that multiculturalism “ghettoizes 
minorities”); DAVID MILLER, ON NATIONALITY 119–30 (1995) (recognizing the difficulty of reconciling 
the demands of ethnicity with the demands of nationality); YAEL TAMIR, LIBERAL NATIONALISM 140–
41 (1993) (noting the inherent danger of the modern nation–state to alienate cultural minorities and 
discussing Kymlicka); CHARLES TAYLOR, RECONCILING THE SOLITUDES: ESSAYS ON CANADIAN 
FEDERALISM AND NATIONALISM 187–200 (Guy Laforest ed., 1993) (attributing the “root cause” of 
Canada’s fractured nationality to Canadian society’s failure to recognize various cultural groups); de 
Lucas, supra note 2; Joseph Raz & Avishai Margalit, National Self-Determination, reprinted in JOSEPH 
RAZ, ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS 110, 110–30 
(1994) (observing that the case for self-government ignores considerations of “fundamental individual 
interests”). 
 10. For a description of groups that have been traditionally excluded, see Iris Marion Young, 
Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship, in FEMINISM AND 
POLITICS 401, 401–29 (Anne Phillips ed., 1998); see also LUIGI FERRAJOLI, DERECHOS Y GARANTÍAS: 
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the best of cases, the state’s indifference and their own invisibility in the 
eyes of the state.  Within this framework, different ways of life were 
accepted in the private sphere but were publicly hindered or prohibited by 
regulations stemming from the cultural perspective of the leading social 
group.  In the worst of cases, the members of the nondominant cultural 
groups were punished or persecuted, and their ways of life forbidden, even 
in the private domain. 
 In this sense, specific cultural groups seek either the equal exercise of 
their members’ rights, on the same terms as those exercised by members of 
the leading social group, or the inclusion of a particular group’s norms and 
values in the definition of rights and institutions collectively supported by 
the members of a separate, specific cultural group.  Either way, equality is 
no longer a right of a nonexisting, universal person, but rather becomes a 
right to live one’s own cultural preferences on equal terms with those who 
follow other cultural preferences, since the state must remain neutral. 
 Fourth, it is certain that law is a cultural product of the group with the 
ability to participate in the lawmaking process.  This participation can be 
direct or, ordinarily, by means of political representatives.  In reality, not all 
who live in the territory of a state can participate in the election of its 
representatives.  Immigrants who have not obtained state citizenship, for 
example, are excluded.11  Nevertheless, a state must ensure the coexistence 
of all people within its territory.   
 If we compare and analyze these ideas, we will find a source of cultural 
conflict.  People who live within the state, many of them permanently, live 
under laws approved by representatives whom they did not elect.  In other 
words, the task of creating culturally neutral laws is entrusted to 
representatives who have been elected, not exclusively, but fundamentally, 
by the members of the leading cultural group in society.  As a result, 
representatives with specific cultural backgrounds are responsible for 
making culturally neutral laws to help the state fulfill its inclusive aim.  
Service employees and judges usually belong to the same leading cultural 
group and, similarly, are entrusted to make decisions that should not be 
culturally conditioned.  The way in which public representatives, service 
employees, and judges favor their own cultural values over those of 
alternative groups also determines the way in which laws and public 
decisions will be culturally conditioned.   
 
                                                                                                             
LA LEY DEL MÁS DÉBIL 75 (Andrés Ibáñez & Andrea Greppi trans., 1999). 
 11. Rubio Marín, supra note 2, at 17–29; RUTH RUBIO-MARÍN, IMMIGRATION AS A 
DEMOCRATIC CHALLENGE: CITIZENSHIP AND INCLUSION IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 2 
(2000); RICARD ZAPATA-BARRERO, MULTICULTURALIDAD E INMIGRACIÓN 26–90 (2004). 
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 Fifth, stating that all laws are culturally conditioned, or stating that 
laws would be of such a general nature in order to accommodate all the 
groups within the state’s territory, would make them unenforceable because 
every individual could excuse his behavior with a cultural exception.  In a 
context like this, the law would fail to serve as a criterion to judge conflicts 
of interest because the cultural customs of the group would prevail over the 
law.  The state would also fail to reach its inclusive goal, since the various 
cultural groups would continue to follow different value systems without 
any communication or commonalities between them.   
 For this reason, it is necessary to underscore the fact that not every 
condition to exercise a right can be considered culturally determined—even 
though such conditions are common in some cultural groups.  Here we must 
contrast the juridical approach from other scientific approaches such as the 
sociological or anthropological ones.  From a sociological or 
anthropological perspective, it is not difficult to examine objectively the 
characteristic behaviors of a cultural group, since it is the mission of a 
sociologist or anthropologist only to describe, rather than judge, the 
behaviors.  Law, in contrast, is a science that must evaluate and judge 
behaviors by certain juridical criteria that form the basis for accepting or 
rejecting such behavior.   
 The aim then is to find a criterion that could serve to judge the attitude 
of laws and public decisions toward the cultural components and 
characteristic behaviors of different social groups.  Individual human 
dignity is the common value that must be respected by all groups.  This 
value limits the ability of group members to justify behavior that infringes 
on another’s dignity based on cultural grounds.  In fact, if we decline to use 
the cultural attitudes of one group to judge the attitudes of another group—
since our judgments must be neutral—the individual is the only remaining 
common element that can be preserved in all contexts regardless of the 
individual’s cultural makeup.   
 Sixth, because we have considered that the conditions, obstacles, and 
prohibitions set by laws in relation to cultural practices must not be 
considered as juridically justified when they are culturally conditioned, the 
question, then, becomes how to determine in fact whether or not they are 
culturally conditioned.  Such laws are not culturally conditioned when their 
purpose is to preserve equal possibilities for: (1) respect and protection of 
constitutional rights; (2) exercise of those constitutional rights; and (3) 
preservation of constitutional values.  Such constitutional rights express, as 
a purely juridical construct, the centrality of the individual in a democratic 
society and establish the juridical concept of human dignity.  Obviously, 
laws that place conditions on these rights have a cultural origin and context.  
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But while a sociological or anthropological approach stresses the cultural 
origin of behavior, the juridical approach focuses on the goals and effects of 
the laws to determine whether the behavior has real cultural significance 
worthy of protection.  A law may originate in a chamber composed 
primarily of members of the same cultural group, but such a law cannot be 
considered culturally conditioned if it is not directed at making one cultural 
concept prevail over another, especially if it is aimed instead at ensuring 
individuals’ constitutional rights.  Human dignity, expressed by the 
recognition of those rights, is a value that can be generalized and attributed 
to all people on equal terms, since no one can claim that one individual’s 
human dignity is less valuable than another’s.   
 Characteristic behaviors of a group will be considered real cultural 
practices if they have no negative consequences for the members of that 
group to exercise their individual rights.  If such practices restrict the 
individual rights of some members of the group, then we will not consider 
them real cultural practices, but rather the result of power relationships that 
are generalized within the group.  Power relationships cannot be 
characteristic of a culture but can be characteristic of a certain time.  
Although culture can evolve by itself or through contact with other outside 
cultures, power relationships within a culture can change without altering 
the essence of the culture.  Therefore, power relationships are not worthy of 
the same protection as cultural practices.  In fact, if we examine our history, 
we can see how many behaviors and attitudes that were characteristic of 
certain times have changed when the power relationships that they 
expressed changed, while the culture itself remained essentially the same.12  
The same public preference for one cultural group over another can be 
considered the expression of a power relationship.  If we reject such power 
relationships, we should also reject power relationships between members 
of the same cultural group that involve a restriction of constitutional rights 
on one part of its membership, especially when the members favored by 
that relationship try to disguise the restriction as cultural custom.   
                                                                                                             
 12. For instance, it would be unacceptable to consider that social discrimination of women in 
the most varied domains (work, education, family, etc.) is an element of the Spanish national identity.  
This is so despite the fact that Spain certainly kept some discriminatory norms towards women and 
socially excluded women’s access to some jobs until the late 1970s and even the 1980s.  By that time, 
most Western European countries had already been enforcing nondiscriminatory policies that favored 
equality between men and women.  Certainly that situation has since changed.  Spain’s current policies 
on equality have the same achievements and faults as the rest of the Western European countries.  Social 
change has been more sudden in Spain in this domain because Spain has had to enforce 
nondiscriminatory policies at the same level of other European countries coming from a situation of 
backwardness in this movement towards equality, but it would be absurd to consider this real social 
change as an adulteration of a supposed, traditional, Spanish national identity.  
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 On the contrary, if conditions and restrictions on rights cannot be 
linked to preserving constitutional rights for all individuals, we will have a 
strong suspicion that they are culturally conditioned and that they express a 
preference for one cultural point of view over others.  If equality helps 
guarantee human dignity, culturally conditioned terms set by laws and 
public decisions interfere with the respect due to human dignity because 
they produce a hierarchy among different cultural expressions in which one 
is given preference over the others.  In the same sense, we will consider 
obstacles and prohibitions that restrict some cultural practices to be 
culturally conditioned even if they apply to all cultural practices regardless 
of their cultural origin.   
 A multiculturalist society is a society that guarantees its members the 
right to express their chosen cultural concepts in a context where public 
institutions are neutral and where the relationships among the members of 
different cultures are developed in an atmosphere of freedom, equality, 
tolerance, individual autonomy, and human dignity.  Such a society 
guarantees an open forum among people with different cultural concepts in 
a framework of freedom and equality.   
 Finally, the study about how different cultural practices can be 
recognized and accommodated by the laws—or the study on 
multiculturalism—must be contextual and practical.  Considering the study 
as contextual involves an awareness that all arguments make sense only in a 
concrete context.  This context can be geographic (and the politics for 
accommodation can vary depending on the fact that we are examining a 
local, regional, national, or international context, and can vary depending on 
which local, regional, national, or international context we examine), social 
(we can consider cultural conflicts as a result of the social exclusion of the 
people who belong to a cultural group), economic (if we consider cultural 
conflicts as a result of economic factors), or cultural (we can consider 
cultural conflicts as the result of the contact among different cultures).  The 
approach to cultural conflicts can also vary depending on which scientific 
point of view we adopt to deal with them, whether juridical, sociological, or 
anthropological.  The arguments addressing a conflict may differ depending 
on the context in which we place ourselves; such arguments may be valid 
explanations and solutions in one context but not in others.   
 In the same sense, cultural problems and claims can differ depending 
on fields of multiculturalism that exist in our separate societies.  Groups 
that are characterized by the sexual orientation of their members argue for 
rights that have been traditionally withheld from them because of their 
sexual orientation.  Cultural groups that immigrate into our society often 
clamor for the recognition of their cultural specificity, expressed through 
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rights common to the rest of the population such as education, work, 
familial relationships, and so on,13 and mix these cultural claims with other 
social and economic claims.  Claims by cultural minorities in federal 
contexts require authorities to the autonomous political institutions to 
recognize and preserve the cultural differences of those groups.  The 
creation of an integrated public forum in Europe that embraces the identities 
of the European states and regions is another advance in the 
multiculturalism field.   
 It is evident that we cannot examine all fields of multiculturalism in 
this Essay.  We will concentrate on the behaviors, attitudes, beliefs, 
language, and feelings of those groups that differ from the leading social 
and cultural group in the state, and we will concentrate on claims that are 
not linked to federalist elements since they do not concentrate in a specific 
territory within the state.  Such groups arise from immigration and the 
maintenance of culture by descendants of immigrants or from the existence 
of previously excluded cultural minorities who are traditionally included as 
part of the state’s population.   
 To require studies on multiculturalism to be practical is to require them 
to address concrete conflicts that are part of reality in concrete contexts.  
The studies on multiculturalism should open a permanent dialogue between 
theory and reality in a process that projects theories into concrete conflicts 
as part of an attempt to find adequate solutions and then to adjust theories 
according to the results of their application to those conflicts.14 
II.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE MULTICULTURAL 
SOCIETY AND THE REACTION OF COURTS 
 There are obvious difficulties in creating a constitutional framework 
reflecting the multicultural reality of our societies that is binding upon the 
courts and public institutions.  The primary problem is that our constitutions 
do not recognize the individual right to behave according to the practices of 
a particular culture.  Some modern constitutions state that public institutions 
must protect each individual’s right of access to culture.15  However, this 
right is conceived in terms of guaranteeing access to cultural goods and 
encouraging the state to perform a political program that puts cultural goods 
                                                                                                             
 13. See generally Amy Gutmann, The Challenge of Multiculturalism in Political Ethics, 22 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 171 (1993) (discussing the nature of claims posed by multiculturalism to social 
justice). 
 14. ZAPATA-BARRERO, supra note 11. 
 15. See, e.g., Constitución [C.E.] art. 44 (Spain), available at http://digbig.com/4pffr (“The 
public authorities shall promote and watch over access to culture, to which all are entitled.”). 
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at everyone’s disposal.  This is a social policy of the state, which does not 
have the same protective characteristics of positive individual rights and 
does not recognize the right to follow one’s own culture.   
 There are certainly some expressions of cultural diversity that are the 
object of constitutional rights such as religion and language, the latter often 
linked to the federalist domain.  For instance, Spain has signed several 
agreements with the Holy See regarding juridical, economic, educational, 
cultural, and religious matters in the army.16  Spain has also signed several 
Cooperation Agreements with the Federation of Evangelical Religious 
Communities of Spain, the Federation of Israelite Communities in Spain, 
and the Islamic Commission of Spain, based on article 16.3 of the Spanish 
Constitution,17 which allows cooperative relationships between the State, 
the Catholic Church, and other religious confessions.18  These agreements 
provide juridical effects to marriages celebrated according to the religious 
rites of those confessions and recognize the right to teach those practices at 
school and to receive religious services in the army, hospitals, prisons, etc.19  
Further, the constitution recognizes the languages of several Spanish 
Autonomous Communities (Galicia, Basque Country, Navarra, Catalonia, 
Valencia, and Balearic Islands) as the official languages in those 
communities along with Spanish.20  In fact, the governments of these 
autonomous communities have performed intensive “normalization” actions 
to make the use of those languages routine in schools, public institutions, 
and in all other social settings.   
 
 
                                                                                                             
 16. Agreement Concerning Religious Assistance to the Armed Forces and Concerning the 
Military Service of Members of the Clergy and Members of Religious Orders, Spain-Vatican, Jan. 3, 
1979, 1154 U.N.T.S. 64, available at http://digbig.com/4pffs. 
 17. C.E. art. 16.3, available at http://digbig.com/4pffr. 
 18. Laws 24/1992, 25/1992 and 26/1992, Nov. 10, that passed the Cooperation Agreements 
held with the Federation of Protestant Religious Entities of Spain, the Federation of Israelite 
Communities in Spain, and the Islamic Committee of Spain, respectively.  Ley 24/1992, de 10 de 
noviembre, por la que se aprueba el acuerdo de cooperacion del estado conla federacion de entidades 
religiosas evangelics de España (B.O.E. 1992, 24853); Ley 25/1992, de 10 de noviembre, por la que se 
aprueba el acuerdo de cooperacion del estado con la federacion de comunidades israelitas de España 
(B.O.E. 1992, 24854); Ley 26/1992, de 10 de noviembre, por la que se aprueba el acuerdo de 
cooperaction del estado con la comision islamica de España (B.O.E. 1992, 24855). 
 19. Arts. 7–9 of Ley 24/1992, de 10 de noviembre, por la que se aprueba el acuerdo de 
cooperacion del estado conla federacion de entidades religiosas evangelics de España (B.O.E. 1992, 
24853); Arts. 7–9 of Ley 25/1992, de 10 de noviembre, por la que se aprueba el acuerdo de cooperacion 
del estado con la federacion de comunidades israelitas de España (B.O.E. 1992, 24854); Arts. 7–9 of 
Ley 26/1992, de 10 de noviembre, por la que se aprueba el acuerdo de cooperaction del estado con la 
comision islamica de España (B.O.E. 1992, 24855). 
 20. C.E. arts. 2–3, available at http://digbig.com/4pfxk. 
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 The constitutions also recognize the protection from discrimination for 
any personal or social condition.  Experience shows, however, that 
protecting concrete expressions of cultural diversity is insufficient to 
consolidate a general recognition of the right to one’s own culture.  On the 
contrary, the constitutions have undoubtedly recognized the right to 
equality, which has been interpreted in terms of uniformity.21  This 
uniformity has caused the courts and public institutions to look at cultural 
differences as suspicious or as something abnormal that must be suppressed 
or at least ignored.  The following three arguments summarize the 
responses of the court and public institutions to such problems.   
A.  Lack of Integration of Cultural Differences 
 Many laws of European countries require immigrants (or any other 
person applying for citizenship) to show a certain degree of integration into 
national society.22  The fact that a person keeps her link with her original 
culture can sometimes be considered a lack of integration.  This was the 
case with a native Moroccan woman who applied for Spanish citizenship in 
1999.  The Spanish national authorities rejected her application because she 
kept a link with her native culture, even though she proved that she had 
sufficient knowledge of the Spanish language and that she had a job in 
Spain.  This case is even more curious because this woman lived in Melilla, 
a Spanish town in northern Africa that keeps open commercial and social 
relations with its neighboring country of Morocco.  The woman appealed 
this decision and the Audiencia Nacional found that she should receive 
Spanish citizenship because she kept a link with her native religion only 
and not with her native culture (Audiencia Nacional decision of June 13, 
2000).  Based on the constitutionally protected freedom of religion, the 
court held that the fact that a person is a Muslim cannot be used to deny her 
application for Spanish citizenship.  However, since the right to keep one’s 
own culture, which is more than religion, is not protected, the decision in 
this case does not prevent one’s native culture from being the basis of 
denial of Spanish citizenship.  In fact, this decision is an example of a 
culturally conditioned decision. 
 
                                                                                                             
 21. Francisco Caamaño Domínguez, De la igualdad como legalidad a la igualdad como 
dignidad: Reflexiones, en clave constitucional, sobre una sociedad decente, in EXTRANJERÍA E 
INMIGRACÍON, supra note 2, at 95. 
 22. E.g., Art. 61 of Ley Orgánica 4/2000, de 11 de enero, sobre derechos y libertades de los 
extranjeros en España y su integración social (B.O.E. Jan. 12, 2000, 544). 
454                                  Vermont Law Review                           [Vol. 30:443 
 
B.  Legal Norms Created by State Law and Equal Application of Those 
Norms to Different Cultural Groups 
 The state must create laws that apply equally to everyone.  These legal 
norms cannot protect cultural differences because they cannot be 
fragmented into multiple cultural divisions.  For instance, Spanish law 
requires a couple to be legally married for a surviving spouse to have access 
to a widowhood pension.23  However, article 49 of the Spanish Civil Code 
recognizes juridical effects only to marriages celebrated “before the Judge, 
Mayor or Service Employee indicated in the Code” or “in the religious way 
legally set.”24  That is, according to the rite of one of the religious 
confessions with which the Spanish state has signed a cooperation 
agreement.25  What happens, however, if a couple has been married 
according to the rite of the Roma people?  This couple may have been 
married for twenty or twenty-five years under the Roma rite, but the 
spouses will not have the right to receive the widowhood pension because 
the state does not legally recognize their marriage (decision of the Superior 
Justice Court of Madrid, November 7, 2002).26  The widowhood pension 
case is an exception because nowadays most of the rights traditionally 
linked with marriage are also recognized for couples that live together in a 
stable way.  In such cases, the state uses the marriage by Roma rite as proof 
that the couple is stable, or a couple in fact (decision of the Provincial Court 
of Valencia, June 18, 2002). 
 The same argument has been used by the courts to decide which parent 
must assume care of the children after a separation or divorce.  Article 92.5 
of the Spanish Civil Code states that the normal solution to this problem 
must be to keep brothers and sisters together.27  This norm is uniformly 
enforced, even in cases where both spouses are Roma, although traditional 
Roma custom dictates that girls live with their mothers and boys live with 
their fathers, and both spouses’ families agree to enforce this solution 
(decision of the Superior Justice Court of Navarra, September 30, 2003). 
 Nevertheless, the courts have fluctuated about how to weigh cultural 
differences when deciding juridical conflicts.  For instance, belonging to the 
Roma minority has sometimes been taken into account as a mitigating 
factor for criminal defendants when social circumstances are important to 
                                                                                                             
 23. Art. 174 of Real Decreto Legislativo 1/1994, de 20 de junio, por el que se aprueba el Texto 
Refundido de la Ley General de la Seguridad Social (B.O.E. June 29, 1994, 14960). 
 24. Código Civil [C.C.] art. 49 (Spain), available at http://digbig.com/4pgsp. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Octavio Salazar Benítez, El derecho a la identidad cultural como elemento esencial de una 
ciudadanía compleja, 127 REVISTA DE ESTUDIOS POLÍTICOS 297 (2005) (Spain). 
 27. C.C. art. 92.5, available at http://digbig.com/4pgsp. 
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understand the reasons for their offenses or crimes.  Since traditional Roma 
customs allow revenge as a socially accepted way to solve problems, at 
least one court considered the culture of the Roma defendant convicted of 
murder as a mitigating factor when determining the sentence to be imposed 
(decision of the Provincial Court of Ávila, January 27, 2004).28  In another 
case, a twenty-four-year-old Roma man accused of sexually abusing a 
fourteen-year-old Roma girl was acquitted by the Supreme Court based on 
their common Roma culture.29  The court took into account the 
characteristic Roma custom of precocious engagements and marriage, the 
fact that the two met freely in a disco, and that the man did not prevail upon 
the girl through a position of superiority.30   
 However, to understand the real terms by which these decisions have 
been constructed, it is necessary to recognize two common elements.  First, 
the courts did not enforce group customs in these cases but instead used the 
Spanish Criminal Code.  By analogizing the altered perceptions of the 
Roma culture to the altered state of mind (and resulting altered 
consciousness) caused by rage or other similar states of passion, which the 
Spanish Criminal Code recognizes as mitigating factors, the Provincial 
Court of Ávila was able to impose a lighter sentence.  Similarly, the 
Spanish Supreme Court did not find the Roma man guilty of sexual abuse 
both because he was following Roma social customs and because he did not 
satisfy the Spanish Criminal Code element of sexual abuse requiring that he 
prevails upon the girl through a position of superiority.  In both cases, the 
Spanish Criminal Code norm was enforced.  Second, this way of enforcing 
criminal norms has been used only when the person accused of a crime and 
her victim are both Romas, not when only the person accused is Roma and 
her victim is not.  
C.  Cultural Practices That Violate Constitutional Rights 
 Some cultural practices must be forbidden because they violate 
constitutional rights.  Article 149 of the Spanish Criminal Code condemns 
the practice of genital mutilation,31 and article 107 of the Spanish Civil 
Code makes it easier (especially for Muslim women) to seek separation and 
divorce.32  If a law does not recognize the right to separate or divorce or it 
                                                                                                             
 28. This decision was revoked by a decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, STS, Feb. 23, 
2005, because the Provincial Court did not admit a psychiatric statement as decisive proof of the fact 
that the convicted could be under the effects of alcohol at the moment of committing murder. 
 29. STS, Jan. 3, 2000. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Código Penal [C.P.] art. 149 (Spain), available at http://digbig.com/4pgst. 
 32. C.C. art. 107, available at http://digbig.com/4pgsw.  
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recognizes both rights only in a discriminatory way, the code enforces 
Spanish law over the law of the country where the marriage took place.33   
 It is helpful to express some of the motives the Spanish Organic Law 
11/200334 uses to justify the inclusion of these norms in the criminal and 
civil codes.  This law was made “from the recognition that social 
integration of foreigners in Spain makes new realities appear to which laws 
must give an adequate response.”35  It is evident that this response is not 
directed to create the possibility that foreigners can express their own 
cultural practices within the law, but that it is directed at preventing some 
behaviors that violate individual rights.  In this sense, the law punishes the 
crime of genital mutilation, or ablation, as the law says, “because the genital 
mutilation of women and children is a practice against which it is necessary 
to fight with the strongest firmness, without justifying it with supposed 
religious or cultural reasons.”36  Besides, the Spanish Civil Code establishes 
the reform that was indicated in the domain of separation and divorce “with 
the objective to improve the social integration of immigrants in Spain and 
to guarantee that they enjoy similar rights to those that the nationals have,” 
and “to guarantee women’s protection towards new social realities that 
appear with the phenomenon of immigration.”37  Clearly, the legal system’s 
concept of social integration consists of abolishing behaviors that violate 
constitutional rights.  The laws concern themselves with practices that are 
widespread in a social group when they find a reason to forbid these 
practices, but the law does not open ways to make it easier to perform the 
cultural preferences in cases where practices do not violate constitutional 
rights.   
 In the same sense, a child’s right to receive education has preference 
over traditional cultural customs when the parents do not want their child to 
attend certain classes; for example, if a Muslim father tries to prevent his 
daughter from attending gymnastics classes.  The European Court of 
Human Rights has applied the same jurisprudence in regard to the 
attendance of sexual education classes.38  In another example, a criminal 
judge condemned a Muslim religious minister in Spain because he 
described and recommended, in a book, the proper way to beat women 
                                                                                                             
 33. Id. 
 34. Ley Orgánica 11/2003, de 29 de septiembre, de medidas concretas en materia de seguridad 
ciudadana, violencia doméstica e integración social de los extranjeros, Exposición de Motivos IV:3 
(B.O.E. 2003, 234), available at http://digbig.com/4pgsx. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. pt. IV:4. 
 38. Kjeldsen v. Denmark, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 27–28 (1976), available at  
http://digbig.com/4pgsy. 
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according to the Muslim tradition (decision of a criminal judge from 
Barcelona, January 12, 2004). 
 When we examine the decisions of courts and public authorities, it is 
difficult to avoid the impression that cultural differences often have been 
viewed as something suspicious and that courts and public authorities have 
had a hostile attitude toward these cultural elements.  The existing legal 
framework provides some instruments for changing this attitude without 
any need to change existing laws.  For instance, it is possible within our 
legal framework to allow the maintenance of links to native culture without 
preventing a foreigner from obtaining citizenship.  The denial of citizenship 
because of cultural reasons is a culturally conditioned decision that gives 
preference to the dominant culture over others and contradicts the inclusive 
aim of modern states.  This creates the difficult problem of determining 
when identification with the national culture can be a requirement for 
obtaining nationality.  The national identity must evolve by incorporating 
elements from both the socially excluded and the majority group. 
Moreover, respect for groups that have been socially excluded in the past 
can be a sign of national identity itself.  The concepts of process, evolution, 
and interaction play an important role in understanding this.39   
 Other changes in the attitude toward different cultural practices could 
require legal changes.  One example is the possible changing of civil norms 
to allow juridical recognition of marriages celebrated according to 
traditional rites of certain social groups.  However, each solution creates 
new problems.  Public institutions must protect constitutional rights and 
ensure the principles of nondiscrimination, but some traditional customs of 
cultural groups were created without considering the need to respect those 
rights and principles.  Must traditional institutions and customs change to 
obtain legal recognition by the state?  To what degree can the state 
recognize any juridical value of customs that do not properly respect 
fundamental constitutional rights and principles?  It is almost impossible to 
respond to these questions from an abstract perspective.  Solutions to these 
questions must be formed on a case-by-case basis with one limit: 
constitutional rights should not give way to practices that contradict them, 
even if these practices are argued from a cultural perspective.   
 Finally, it is necessary to understand that cultural diversity is a 
fundamental element of our present society and that claims for cultural 
freedom and recognition appeal to the fundamental basis and principles of 
social relationships,40 the very principles that require constitutional 
                                                                                                             
 39. de Lucas, supra note 2, at 66–70. 
 40. Salazar Benítez, supra note 26. 
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recognition.41  When we speak about the right to practice one’s chosen 
culture, we deal with a claim that is constitutional in nature.  Nevertheless, 
there is currently a conflict between this constitutional claim and the lack of 
recognition by our constitutions of an individual’s right to behave according 
to the customs and practices of the cultural group to which an individual 
belongs.  We can certainly derive a weak recognition of such a right from 
some basic constitutional principles, such as freedom and individual 
autonomy, but this does not provide clear protection for this right.  The 
constitutional right to privacy can provide an additional way to deduce a 
sort of protection for the right to behave according to one’s own culture, but 
the object of discussion is not the right to behave in this way in one’s 
private life.  Problems arise when public authorities erect culturally 
conditioned obstacles to common practices in certain cultural groups.  Two 
examples will be discussed to demonstrate the kind of problems that can 
arise due to the lack of an express recognition of the right to one’s own 
culture.   
1.  Use of the Hijab at School  
 In Germany, Denmark, the United Kingdom, the Low Countries, and 
Spain, the use of the hijab by girls at public schools is commonly allowed.  
It is allowed for reasons such as the freedom of belief (Germany), the 
rejection of discriminatory measures (Denmark, U.K., and Low Countries), 
and the aim to ensure the schooling of all students of foreign origin (Spain).  
It is curious, however, that the use of the hijab has not been admitted in any 
                                                                                                             
 41. In fact, one of the most frequent criticisms to Kymlicka’s theories stems from the lack of 
current cultural claims outlining the cultural options from which people may choose.  Gianni, supra note 
5, at 35; see also WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY AND CULTURE 168–69 (1989) 
(responding to arguments that restrictions on claims are necessary to protect society and stating that 
“liberalism requires that we can identify, protect, and promote cultural membership, as a primary good, 
without accepting . . . [the] claim that this requires protecting the character of a given cultural 
community”).  This problem poses the question of which cultural preferences must be protected.  The 
possible options range from restricting protection to only national communities to the broader protection 
of cultural groups.  See Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM: 
EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 25, 25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994) (contrasting “the driving 
forces behind nationalist movements in politics” with the urgent demand for recognition for cultural 
groups as a means of establishing an identity); Young, supra note 5, at 351 (discussing the difficulty in 
selecting a group representative); Iris Marion Young, Together in Difference: Transforming the Logic of 
Group Political Conflict, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES 155, 174 (Will Kymlicka ed., 1995) 
(noting the dilemma that “a unified class-based social movement is necessary to achieve [social] 
change,” but that “justice within and as a result of such a movement requires differentiating group 
needs”).  For a summary of the main arguments on this subject, see generally María José Añón Roig, La 
interculturalidad posible: ciudadanía diferenciada y derechos, in LA MULTICULTURALIDAD, supra note 
2, at 217. 
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of these countries as an expression of a right to behave according to one’s 
own culture.  The hijab is indeed an important cultural component.  It is 
even more curious that in France, where the cultural argument has been 
considered in relation to the hijab controversy, the cultural element of its 
use has provided arguments to forbid this practice at schools because of the 
risk of dividing students into different cultural communities.42   
 Cases can get even more complicated.  The decision of the German 
Federal Constitutional Court (September 24, 2003) held that prohibiting a 
teacher from teaching at public schools because she wanted to wear her 
hijab violated her constitutional rights.43  However, the reason for this 
decision was that the state (Baden-Württemberg) did not have a law 
forbidding such a practice, not that the practice was a protected cultural 
right.44  Baden-Württemberg and other German states have since announced 
that they will pass several laws prohibiting teachers from wearing the hijab 
in school in the near future.45  But obviously, there is no problem if a nun 
wears her frock in school.   
2.  Roma Caravans  
 There is also an interesting decision from the European Court of 
Human Rights.  In Beard v. United Kingdom, members of the Roma 
minority claimed the right to continue living in caravans according to their 
tradition.46  The claim was directed against decisions of local authorities of 
the United Kingdom forbidding them to live on the lands that the Romas 
owned because the caravans harmed the environment and aesthetics of the 
landscape.47  The authorities of the United Kingdom offered to move the 
Romas to other lands, but these places were uninhabitable and were not 
large enough to accommodate the caravans of all the families affected by 
the measure.48  The court acknowledged that article 8 of the European 
                                                                                                             
 42. Law No. 2004-228 of Mar. 15, 2004, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] 
[Official Gazette of France], Mar. 17, 2004, p. 5190. 
 43. Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Sep. 24, 2003, 108 
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 282 (F.R.G.), available at 
http://digbig.com/4pgta. 
 44. Id. 
 45. A comment about this decision can be found in María Ángeles Martín Vida & Sven 
Müller-Grune, ¿Puede una maestra portar durante las clases en una escuela pública un pañuelo en la 
cabeza por motivos religiosos?, 24 REVISTA ESPAÑOLA DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL 313, 314 (2004) 
(Spain). 
 46. Beard v. United Kingdom, 33 Eur. H.R. Rep. 442, 464 (2001), available at 
http://digbig.com/4pgtb. 
 47. Id. at 450–51. 
 48. Id. at 452–53. 
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Convention on Human Rights, which recognizes the right to private and 
familial life, forces the state to allow Roma to continue their traditional way 
of life.49  However, the court also stated that it could not judge the decisions 
of national authorities about territorial policy because in such instances the 
court must defer to decisions of the state where the state has a discretionary 
appreciation margin.50  The court admitted that there is a consensus forming 
in Europe about the need to recognize the ways of life of minorities, but it 
recognized that this consensus is not yet concrete enough to require specific 
state obligations.51  Thus, the decision leaves the impression of having 
recognized an empty right.  It says that Romas have the right to live 
according to their traditional customs, but it also says that this right can be 
limited by the decisions of public authorities regarding territorial policy, 
and that the state is not obligated to accommodate displaced persons 
affected by those measures.   
 The fact that the right to one’s own culture does not have a specific 
constitutional recognition weakens its protection and puts it at the disposal 
of public authorities to limit it based on the most diverse social interests.  
Giving a specific constitutional recognition to such a right would strengthen 
its protection and would help to clearly establish its limits.  One such limit 
must be the prohibition of widespread cultural practices that violate 
constitutionally recognized individual rights.   
CONCLUSION 
 The attitude of courts and public institutions toward cultural diversity 
has often been characterized by mistrust.  The practices of cultural diversity 
that come from specific social groups have been considered a suspicious 
element that tends to break the principle of equality, which is one of the 
fundamental bases of the democratic state.   
 Equality has often been understood as a synonym for uniformity.  
There is no reflection in public institutions about how a constitution and the 
laws can be conditioned by cultural practices of the majority, and there is 
no recognition of an individual right to express one’s culture by specific 
characteristic behavior.  When one attempts to consider questions of 
cultural diversity, the result has no real effect and recognizes an empty 
right.  Similarly, there has been no attempt to change the traditional ways of 
interpreting the concepts of equality and neutrality in order to understand 
them as attitudes of equal respect for all cultures, when cultural practices do 
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not violate individual rights, rather than as attitudes to prevent the cultural 
practices of the minority groups from being performed at all.52   
 On the contrary, a constitution and the laws are deemed to be culturally 
neutral and, therefore, to set the standard for which minority cultural groups 
must strive to accommodate.  The neutral nature of a constitution and the 
laws make this accommodation a unilateral process—rather than a bilateral 
one—by which minorities try to conform.  The protection that a state gives 
to cultural practices comes from its prohibition on discrimination, but 
reality shows that this kind of protection is not sufficient to guarantee 
individuals’ rights to practice behaviors that are characteristic of their 
cultural groups.   
 Individuals’ constitutional rights always have preference over a 
hypothetical collective right of a social group to perform behaviors 
customary within that group when these hypothetical rights contradict the 
constitutional rights.  In fact, there is no problem in admitting that 
individuals’ constitutional rights have preference over the customs that are 
common within a group, since social practices that violate constitutional 
rights of the individuals of the same social group must be treated not as 
cultural practices but as power relationships among the individuals that 
compose a group.  Power relationships cannot be protected over the 
constitutional rights of the individuals that are part of them.  If we want 
cultural diversity to be accepted in society, it is necessary to reject practices 
associated with power relationships because they violate the rights of the 
individuals, which in turn causes mistrust and rejection among the majority 
of the society.  Moreover, supporting those practices favors neither a free 
cultural dialogue nor the creation of links and the feeling of confidence 
among individuals of different groups.  The practices of specific social 
groups have usually been taken into account by courts and public 
institutions only to reject reliance on them in cases in which they endanger 
constitutional rights.   
 However, there are some cultural practices that do not affect 
individuals’ constitutional rights and that sometimes have not received the 
recognition of the right to be performed by the individuals of the social 
group.  So these attitudes can be interpreted as culturally conditioned 
because they express a preference for one specific cultural practice over 
another, or because they tend to deny an individual’s right to express his or 
her own culture.  The image of the universal citizen, devoid of all cultural 
signs, is a fiction.  All people have a cultural background, and the 
                                                                                                             
 52. Neutrality is not considering cultural differences unimportant, but rather allowing all 
cultural differences to express themselves and according them equal treatment. 
462                                  Vermont Law Review                           [Vol. 30:443 
 
possibility of expressing cultural behaviors must be considered a 
requirement of human dignity.  Human dignity is a basis for the recognition 
of constitutional rights, among other reasons, because the laws always have 
a specific cultural background.  If we reject the possibility of individuals to 
express behaviors characteristic of their own cultures, we are admitting a 
preference for the social group, the cultural premises of which are expressed 
in the laws over the cultural options of other social groups.  This contradicts 
the inclusive aim of the state, which must embrace all individuals who live 
within its territorial limits, whatever their cultural practices may be, as a 
guarantee of human dignity and a peaceful cohabitation.  In fact, the right to 
express a different cultural identity is the real basis for the principle of 
equality in cultural terms while the uniformity imposed by laws results in 
inequality by giving preference to certain cultural practices over others. 
